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THE LAW PERTAINING TO ESTUARINE
LANDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA*
WmiAM
JOHN
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AND USE OF ESTuARrNE AimAs

De8meiption

To anyone not a long-time inhabitant of coastal areas, the
very words, "estuary" and "estuarine," have a peculiar ring;
and the meaning is doubly obscure. "Marsh" or "tideland" is
more comfortable and, in popular terms, more understandable.
However, regardless of the particular name one chooses to use,
the basic meaning remains the same-an area bordering the sea
and subject to the ebb and flow of the daily tides. In other
words, one of those places on the earth's surface where, if you
stood in the same place for 24 hours, your feet would be wet
half the time and dry the other half. David A. Rice has stated
the definition in this way:
Estuarine areas are those coastal complexes where
fresh water from the land meets the salt water of the
sea with a daily tidal flux.'
In the horizontal physical extent, estuaries can vary from
zero inches or feet (as, for instance, where the sea meets a vertical wall of rock) to several yards or even miles across the land.
The extent, of course, is dictated by the rise and fall of the
shore, the strength of the gravitational pull of the moon, and
(to a lesser degree) the pull of sun.2
* This paper was prepared for the Belle W. Baruch Foundation by whose
permission the article is here printed.
** 1916-1969. A.B., Nebraska State College, 1954; LL.B., cum laude,
Nebraska University School of Law; Sterling Fellow, Yale University School
of Law; private practice, Washington, D.C. and Chicago, Ill.; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; Associate Professor of
Law, University of South Carolina, 1966-1969.
*** A.B., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University; Associate
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.

1. Rice, Estuarine Lands of North Carolina: Legal Aspects of Ownership,
Use and Control 1 (1968 Study Report on Estuarine Lands published by the
University of North Carolina Institute of Government at Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, hereinafter cited as "Rice").
2. High tide occurs at a place of observation at intervals of 12 hours
25 minutes, and low tide at times halfway between them. These
are occasions when the ocean level at the place is the highest
and lowest, respectively, for that particular cycle.
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In the State of South Carolina, there are approximately
1,088,968 acres from the mean high water mark to the three mile
State boundary.3 Approximately 660,808 acres lie landward
from the mean low water mark (estuarine areas) and 428,160
acres lie seaward. 4 That is, an area slightly less than the size of
Rhode Island is twice daily covered and uncovered by water.
B. Use
1. Fising
As would be expected, the continual salt water submergence
of estuarine land makes it unfit for ordinary farming in the
usual sense of crop growing and tillage. However, some "crops")
-such as oysters, fish, shrimp, and crabs-can be raised or generated in estuarine areas. It has been estimated that 98% of all
coastal fisheries depend on estuaries for replenishment of popular forms of edible sea life. 5
In economic terms, the value of estuarine lands to the citizens
of South Carolina who are engaged in fishing as a full-time
occupation has been estimated from a low of $11,000,000 to a
high of $132,000,000.8 This does not include the value of fish
taken by recreational sports fishermen which, if included, would
double the dollar and cents value.7
2. Residential Development
A substantial portion of the estuarine lands of South Carolina
can be utilized, with a minimum of dredging and filling, as
residential property. Such dredging, however, destroys the
value of marshland for spawning purposes and, if sufficiently
extensive, can inflict permanent harm on the fishing industry,
harm that is particularly direct in regard to the lessees of oyster
beds. In addition, dredging by individual landowners can cause
adverse effects on adjacent property owners by deposits of mud,
The spring tide occurs when the moon is new or full. Because
the moon and sun are then attracting from the same or opposite

directions, lunar and solar tides reinforce each other; the high
tide is highest and the low tide is lowest for the month. The
neap tide occurs when the moon is at either quarter phase. Then
the moon and sun are 900 apart in the sky, so that one set of
tides is partly neutralized by the other.
BAmR, ASTRONOMY §§ 525-.26 (7th ed. 1959).
3. Latimer, Tidelands, Submerged Lands and Navigable Waters of South
Carolina 16 (Unpublished memorandum prepared for the State Attorney
General's Office 1967. Hereinafter cited as "Latimer").
4. Id.
5. Id. at 13.
6. Id. at 13-14.
7. Id.
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silt, or sand, or by causing geologic changes in the erosion
characteristics of wave action. There is no statutory law protecting the rights of adjoining landowners against deleterious
consequences resulting from construction executed by waterfront
neighbors.
3. Phosphate Deposits
In a still-continuing process-the origins of which date back
to prehistoric times-those species of sealife that are most
clearly dependent on estuaries for existence leave a permanent
record of their life on the coastline in the form of phosphate
rock deposits made up of the skeletal remains of the shoreline
inhabitants. Oysters are, perhaps, the best example of this
process.
Phosphate rock, occurring most commonly as calcium phosphate (Cas (PO,).), can be mined with dredging equipment and
used commercially for a wide variety of purposes, the most common use being the manufacture of fertilizers.8
By chemical
reduction, calcium phosphate can also produce elementary phosphorus, a widely used chemical in its own right. 9 At present,
the precise extent of phosphate deposits in South Carolina is
unknown, but it appears extensive enough to be commercially
valuable. The State Budget and Control Board is the agency
charged with the responsibility of issuing leases for phosphate
mining, and some leases have been issued. 10
4. General Value to the State
An editorial which appeared in the November 6, 1966, edition
of The Charleston News and Gourier, succinctly describes both
the general value of the South Carolina marshlands and the
problems which the State must face in achieving the optimum
development of this natural resource:
"Once valued chiefly by fiddler crabs and oyster catchers, the tidelands of South Carolina now represent big
money. A dispute over ownership until recently was of
interest only to lawyers. Now it is of significance to
South Carolinians in general.
Thirty years ago the State Supreme Court declared
much of the area covered and uncovered each day by
the tides to be public property. Lower courts have re8. SIENKO & PLANE, CEmISTRY 384-85 (2d ed. 1961).

9. Id. at 503-08.

10. Latliner, supra note 3, at 15.
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peatedly acted to prevent unlawful invasion by profiteers. The matter nevertheless continues to be in
dispute.
The speed with which pile drivers and modern earth
moving equipment convert marshland into building lots
threatens to make the argument academic. Developers
on pursuit of big profits boldly contest what appears to
be a gray area of the law. Landfill projects often are
completed, we are informed, before the courts can act to
halt them.
The debate over who owns the marshlands is too important to be settled by claim jumpers. In addition to
possessing value as recreational and sightseeing areas,
tidelands are breeding grounds for marine life of vast
economic importance.
Until the courts have ruled otherwise, state officials
have a duty to supply effective protection for marshlands. This includes using its policemen to bar trespassers and whatever other means are necessary to evict
squatters."
C. GeneraZ Observations
Although it is beyond the scope of this report to present detailed information on the possible uses of estuarine areas, the
foregoing may help the reader who is unfamiliar with coastal
areas to better visualize the physical characteristics and the
importance of marshlands to the State of South Carolina.
II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LAW OF ESTUAIaNE Ow mRsmP

A. Under English Common Law
At early common law, with foundations firmly rooted in a
feudal concept of land ownership, the King was taken to hold
title to all English lands, including tidelands, and his title was
of a personal proprietary nature." Ownership of this type
carried with it the ability to grant exclusive rights or privileges
to a subject in such lands. The grant of manorial holdings to
favored subjects of the Crown is an example of the exercise of
this power.
This rather clear arrangement (The King owns it privately
and in full; he can give it away-or sell it-to anyone he
11. Rice, mupra note 1, at 4.
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wishes.) was, however, complicated even in the early common
law by an important additional rule applied in those cases of
coastline manorial grants. Although the King could grant
rights in tidelands, a grant of a manor on high ground (above
the ordinary ebb and flow of the tide) would not carry with
it any rights to adjacent lands beneath tidal waters unless the
grant specifically stated that such rights were included therein
or proof of customary usage consistent with such rights could be
12
adduced by the subject who claimed tideland ownership.
This rule might be designated a "mere" rule of construction
used, for some unknown reason, only in construing grants of
high lands bordering on tidal waters, especially since the same
rule was not only not used in land grants which bordered nontidal waters, but a completely antithetical rule was applied in
those cases. A Crown grant of land adjacent to non-tidal waters
automatically carried with it title to the land beneath those
waters, unless the grant specifically excluded that land as being
13
outside the extent of the grant.
The precise reason for these differing rules applied to the
construction of land grants depending on whether the land was
adjacent to tidal or non-tidal waters is unclear. One can theorize, of course, that there existed a felt need, imperfectly verbalized, to distinguish tidal from non-tidal lands because of the
rather greater importance of tidelands and coastal areas to the
then-existing structure of English life. Perhaps the fact that
England was an island largely dependent on a sea-related
economy rather than a self-sustaining continent, helps justify
the distinction. In any case, the "mere" rule of construction
once applied to grants of land bordering tidal waters became,
after Magna Carta, a rule of substance--and a firm rule at that
-which made the granting of tidelands not only difficult, but
actually impossible, for the King.1 4
The vehicle for this accomplishment was in reality quite
simple. Instead of continuing as a method of grant interpretation, the rule was looked upon as establishing that tidelands
existed as a separate type of property, one held by the King in
trust for the people and incapable of being transferred to a
12. Sir Henry Constable's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 106a, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (1601).
13. Rice, supra note 1, at 4.
14. Id. at 5 and cases there cited. Although the change occurred after
Magna Carta, it was not necessarily because of Magna Carta. See generally
the arguments contained in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 35-36 (Clark

ed. 1967).
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private individual. 5 Rights granted prior to the shift of tidelands from a "King as absolute owner" category (jus privatum)
to a "King as trustee" category (jus publicum) were not
affected but could be shown as derived from ancient grants.10
Only Parliament, after the change was completed, had power
to grant jus publicum lands to private persons. 17 This power
derived from Parliament's role as the representative of the
English people, the beneficiaries of the jus publioum trust lands.
By moving tidelands from the private to the public sector, the
need for a precise definition of the geographic extent of the
trust lands became apparent-and important. Professor Rice
states the situation in these terms [footnotes have been omitted]:
The problem of determining whether a conveyance of
high land also conveyed some part of the shore or tideland was always of some moment in England since,
even before the refinement of the common law principles relating to ownership of the tidelands, there was
a need to ascertain the extent of the King's grants.
However, the need for resolving this question became
more acute following the introduction of the division
of the King's title into two separate categories since the
law was then dealing with a conflict between private
and public rights rather than a private controversy
between the King and his subject over the terms of
their private contract.
In 1601, Sir Henry Constable's Case held that a.
Crown grant of land upon the seacoast was, under the
general rule, a conveyance of only those lands above the
high water mark. This rule applied to lands situated
on the seacoast and royal rivers which, according to the
1604 decision in The Royal Fishery of the Banne, included "[e]very navigable river, so high as the sea flows
and ebbs in it .... " The high water mark itself was
determined by "the line of the medium high tide between the springs and the neaps" on the theory that the
land below that line was "not capable of ordinary cultivation or occupation" while the land above the line
was "for the most part dry and maniorable." . . .
The common law of England distinguished between
jus privatum and jus publicum lands on the basis of
whether or not the waters covering the land were tidal
15. Rice, s-pra note 1, at 5.

16. Id.
17. Id.
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or non-tidal rather than by deciding if the waters were
navigable or non-navigable. This is made entirely clear
from the language employed by the court in The Royal
Fishery of the Banne; it is even more apparent when
that decision is viewed against subsequent English
cases in which the common right of navigation in nontidal waters was upheld. Thus, although the early decisions in the United States, most notably Palner v.
Mulligan in which Chancellor Kent wrote the opinion
for the court, declared that The Royal Fishery of the
Banne defined navigable waters in terms of the ebb and
flow of the tide, it can be fairly stated that this has
probably never been the English rule.'
It is significant to note that-in terms of ownership alonethe common law used only the tidal-nontidal test and not the
navigable-nonnavigable test occasionally employed by later
courts. The point becomes important as the two concepts
slowly overlap and create confusion in later cases, as illustrated
19 supra, and as
by Rice's remarks about Palmer v. Mudligan%,
notably Cates v. Wadlingseen in various South Carolina 2cases,
1
ton20 and McCullough v. Wall.
The situation in England, then, shortly before the settlement
of America, can be summarized by the following diagram:
High Water Mark ----

I

Low Water Mark

I

II
-IV

0
o

I
I

18.
19.
20.
21.

V

Rice, supra note 1, at 6-7.
3 Caines 307, 2 Am. Dec. 270 (N.Y. 1805).
1 McCord 580 (S.C. 1822).
4 Rich. 68, 53 Am. Dec. 715 (S.C. 1850).
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CLASS I LAND: Highlands or fast lands: could be conveyed
by grant from the King.
CLASS II LAND: Estuarine lands; could be conveyed only
by Act of Parliament. A King's grant of Class I Land
bordering Class II Land 'would not convey Class II Land,
regardless of the words used.
CLASS III LANDS: Tidal, Navigable waters. Treated like
Class II Land.
CLASS IV LAND: Navigable, non-tidal waters. Treated like
Class I Land. Class I Land bordering Class IV Land would
carry to the thread of the stream.
CLASS V LAND: Non-navigable tidal waters. Same as Class
II & III.
CLASS VI LAND: Non-navigable, non-tidal waters. Same as
Class IV.
B. The ColoniaZ Period
1. Background of the Period
Although, as Rice points out,2 2 settlement of that portion of

North America which included the present States of North
and South Carolina was first attempted by Sir Walter Raleigh
under Crown letters patent of 1584, the disappearance of the
Roanoke colony in 159023 and Raleigh's subsequent conviction of
treason in 160324 spelled the end of this first attempt. Under
charters obtained by the London Company in 1606 and 1608,
portionsf of North Carolina were granted and settled, 2r but it
was not until 1663-after the turbulent years following the
reign of Charles I-that a grant was made which resulted in
the settlement of South Carolina.20 Between 1663 and 1711, the
Lord Proprietors governed a single area which included both
Carolinas as one unit,27 selling land and occasionally throwing

sops to the settlers in an attempt to maintain the lucrative concession. Even religious toleration was permitted so the Pro28
prietors could maintain an advantageous market price.
In 1711, to simplify the business of governing the colony, the
Proprietors divided their grant lands into North and South
22. Rice, supra note 1, at 8.

23.

BEARD & BEARD, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
24. BOWEN, TnE LION AND THE THRONE, 190 (1957)
Trials 2).
25. Rice, supra note 1, at 9.
26. Beard & Beard, supra note 23, at 32.

16-17 (Rev. ed. 1929).
(citing 2 Howell St.

27. Id. at 33.

28. Id.
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Carolina, hoping, perhaps, to meet some of the colonists' demands for a greater voice in governmental affairs.29 However,
the division was not successful and the situation had deteriorated so far by 1729 that the Proprietors sold the lands back to
the Crown, reserving "to all and every person.., all such right,
title and interest .

.

. as any of them now have ....

,30

thus

protecting those who had settled lands granted by the Proprietors.
From 1729 to the formation of an independent republic in
1776, the Crown-acting through royal governors-administered
the affairs of the established American colonies. 31
9. The LegaZ Effects of Colonization
Although there are several legal aspects of this period which
are interesting in and of themselves as studies in the best way
to govern colonial areas (An Issac Walton oriented Machiavellian might collect this material and call it "The Compleat Lord
Proprietor."), one matter of continuing and primary importance is the well-established rule that the Proprietors' title to
grant lands could be no greater than that possessed by the
King.32 From this principle, it follows that "the Crown could

give the Proprietors no greater powers to dispose of jus
publicum lands than the Crown itself possessed." 33
However, an important corollary to this doctrine is the extent
to which colonies were bound by decisions of English courts.
John A. Horlbeck, in his article on titles to South Carolina
marshlands, describes the extent this way 34 [footnotes have been
renumbered]:
Our Court often held that the common law of England
is in force in the State of South Carolina, unless repealed or modified by statute. 35 A presumption exists
that no change in the common law was intended by any
statute unless the language employed clearly indicates
such intention. 36 But state courts, in construing the
29. Id.
30. Rice, supra note 1, at 13.

31. Beard & Beard, supra note 23, at 33.
32. Martin v. Wtkdell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413-14 (1942).
33. Rice, supra note 1, at 14.
34. Horlbeck, Titles to Marshlands in South Carolina, 14 S.C.L.Q. 288, 298
(1962).
35. State v. Charleston Bridge Co., 113 S.C. 116, 101 S.E. 657 (1919);
O'Hagan v. Fraternal Aid Union, 144 S.C. 84, 141 S.E. 893 (1928).
36. Coakley v. Tidewmater Constr. Corp., 194 S.C. 284, 9 S.E. 2d 724 (1940);
Nuckolis v. Great A & P Tea Co., 192 S.C. 156, 5 S.E2d 862 (1939).
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common law existing in the state, are not necessarily
bound by decisions of courts of England. 37
Although Horlbeck discusses the ability of state courts to review-and possibly reject-English cases, the comment is appropriate to the colonial period because it is through the decisions
of state courts that acts of colonial governments are given
present effect. With the state courts, then, not iron-clad bound
by English cases, an important inquiry is whether the ebb and
flow doctrine announced in The Royal Fishery of the Banne8"
and used to define estuarine areas as jus publican lands in that
case, and in England, was applicable to grants made by the
Lord Proprietors in the Carolinas. This question is best answered by scrutinizing the decisions of the South Carolina
Supreme Court in those cases when the Court was faced by this
issue.
C. Estuarine Ownership Under State Law
1. 1777 to 1928
The first case to reach the South Carolina Supreme Court
which presented an issue as to estuarine ownership was State v.
Pacific Guano Co., an 1884 decision.3 9 The rather long passage
of time since the revolution and the legal inactivity on questions
of tideland ownership might seem peculiar at first glance, but
the Court itself, apparently aware of the novelty (and importance) of these questions, pointed out what seems to be an entirely plausible explanation for the quiescence:
Within a period comparatively recent, probably less
than thirty years, the fortunate discovery was made
that the beds and marshes of these marine channels
contained large quantities of phosphatic rocks, making
had been regarded utterly
that valuable which before
40
worthless as property.
The case had been commenced in 1882 by an information filed
by the state attorney general to recover damages from the
defendant corporation for having removed large quantities of
phosphate rock from the beds of various creeks situated in
Beaufort County. As a part of the cause, the state, of course,
claimed title to the creek beds. In defense, Pacific Guano Co.
relied on a series of grants extending back to colonial times,
37. State v. Wilson, 162 S.C. 413, 161 S.E. 104 (1931).
38. Davis Rep. 55, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (1605).

39. 22 S.C. 50 (1884).

40. Id. at 66.
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and possession by the company's vendors of the lands in question
under color of title for almost 100 years. Interestingly enough,
the state did not claim the marshlands covered by the several
grants, either at trial or on appeal, but focused the complaint
solely on the creek beds, i.e., the areas below low water mark
that were permanently covered by water. The marshland ownership issue was, however, injected into the case-not by the
state-but through the backdoor as an attempted defense. The
Court stated the problem in this way:
If we clearly understand the scope of the defense, it is
not claimed that there ever has been an express grant
for the beds in question. Such express grant for lands
at all times under water, and as property regarded
worthless, until the discovery of the phosphate deposits,
was probably never desired or applied for; and if made,
would not have been worth the cost of obtaining it, or
even the paper on which it was written; but the claim is
that the vendors of the defendants were for a very long
time-some eighty years-in possession of the high
lands of Chisolm's Island, under a plat which covered
the whole island, through which most of these channels
penetrate, and that possession of part with color of title
to the whole island must be considered as giving title to
the beds of these channels in one of two ways: either
by construction of the grants of the high lands, that
is to say, by force of the doctrine applicable to riparian
proprietors, which, in certain cases, gives to the owner
of the soil or both sides of a stream title to the bed of
that stream; or, second, that such long possession of the
high lands under such color of title authorizes and requires the presumption of a new grant from the state,
expressly41 covering and giving title to the beds of these
streams.
Before considering these defenses, the Court embarked on a
discussion of the English common law applicable to tidelands,
accurately stating, "The fundamental idea was that the property
in the sea and tide-waters, and in the soil and shore thereof,
was in the sovereign." 42 However, the Court, relying on cases
which had, themselves, only imperfectly understood the common-law situation, then went somewhat astray and introduced
41. Id. at 74-75.
42. Id. at 75.
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the navigable-nonnavigable standard as a second matter to be
considered. Utilizing the general principle that English decisions are not necessary binding in this country, the Court decided that only those streams which were navigable in fact were
navigable in law, notwithstanding the fact that the tide might
happen to ebb and flow in a particular stream and citing with
approval the language of Mr. Justice Field in The Daniel Ball,
a United States Supreme Court case, where it was said:
The doctrine of the common law as to the navigability
of waters has no application in this country. Here the
ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test
as in England, or any test at all, of the navigability of
waters. There no waters are navigable, in fact, or at
least to any considerable extent, which are not subject
to the tide, and from this circumstance tidewater and
navigable water signify substantially the same thing. 43
Turning then to the facts of the case as found by the Circuit
judge, the Court decided that two of the creeks, while tidal,
were not navigable and, therefore, must "go out of the case. We
cannot hold that the bed of a creek not navigable, although
tidal, belongs to the state to the exclusion of the riparian proprietor." 44 But as to the other creeks found to be navigable and
claimed by the defendant under the theory of the first defense,
the Court said:
Do they belong to the proprietors of the high lands
upon the principle of riparian ownership? We think
not. These are all channels in which the tide ebbs and
flows, and as to such the well established rule is, that a
grant of the shore gives title only to the high water
mark, the mean between extreme high and low tides.
,Chancellor Kent says: "It is a settled principle of the
English law that the right of owners of land bounded
by the sea or on navigable rivers where the tide ebbs
and flows, extends to high water mark; and the shore
below common, but not extraordinary high water mark,
45
belongs to the public."
With this language the Court struck down the first d(efen>.%
In addition, the opinion is careful to point out that, although
certain grants from the state held by the defendants purported
43. 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 557, 563 (1871).

44. State v. Pacific Guano, supra note 39, at 79.
45. Id. at 79-80.
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to convey land to the low water mark, in light of the announced
rule, a serious question of the state's authority to convey this
land existed but, "whether the grants of 1869 [the grants in
question] were issued by proper authority and are binding upon
46
the state, is not before us for adjudication."
As for the second defense, the Court found that with the
doctrine of nulum tempus occumzit

regi 47

existing in the state

before 1870, and the passage of a 40 year adverse possession
statute of limitation in that year, the defendants could not
establish the second defense4 8 because only 14 years had elapsed
instead of the required

40.

In a further discussion of this second defense, in what is
rather clearly dicta, the court intimates that a special act of the
legislature would be required to transfer jus publicum tidelands and stream beds.49 Whether or not this position is sound
must wait for later discussion.
One other point about the Pacific Guano case should be noted.
Some writers have tended to bypass this case in favor of an
earlier decision, apparently because the earlier case is represented to be the only case to which the state was a party and in
which the question of title to land between high and low water
mark was expressly in issue. 50 The earlier case these writers
refer to was State v. The South CarolinaPhosphate Company
Ltd. (alias, The Oaks Point Mines) reported in the appendix
to 22 S.C. at 593. This Case was a Circuit Court decision
handed down in 1874 that found its way into the reports ten
years later when, for some unknown reason, Justice McGowan
(author of the Pacific Guano opinion) suggested to the Court
Reporter that it be printed in the appendix to Volume 22. This
suggestion to the Reporter was apparently an informal one
made orally, perhaps because Justic McGowan had quoted a
small part of the opinion in the main case and wished the principal case to be as complete as possible. Nowhere in the Pacific
Guano opinion does the Court officially order the Oak Point
Mines case reported as a binding precedent or adopt the lower
46. Id. at 81.
47. "Time does not run against the sovereign."
48. In 1870, the state enacted a 40 year statute of limitations for adverse
possession cases, then amended the statute in 1873 to reduce the required
period to 20 years. The statute is now codified as S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-121
et seq. (1962).
49. State v. Pacific Guano Co., supra note 39, at 83-84.
50. Logan & Williams, Tidelands in South Carolina: A Study in the Law
of Real Property, 15 S.C.L. REv. 657, 663 (1963).
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court opinion in that case as its own. Therefore, to base arguments on the Oak Point Mines opinion-beyond the precise
limits of language in that case actually quoted in Supreme
Court opinions-would seem to be a risky business.
Following the ,State v. Pacific Guano case, there are some
nine cases reported before 1928 which deal more or less directly
with the questions of the extent of State ownership of tidelands
and the ability of the State to grant these lands.5 1 In some of
these cases, the points are of minor importance, but in those
cases in which the extent-of-ownership issue is important, the
court consistently recognizes the common law "high-water
mark" rule applied to tidal navigable streams. 5 2 As for the
question concerning the ability of the State to grant tidelands,
in those cases involving the issue, the point is either not
reached 53 or the factual circumstances of the case make it
appear that the general jus publ'cum rule is not appropriate
in the particular case.5 4 Thus, before 1928, it could be stated
with some certainty that title to land between high and low
water mark was in the State (with the navigable stream concept
thrown in, of course), but whether or not the State could grant
this land in the usual manner was a matter of serious doubt.
In addition, the other method of obtaining private title to
marshland that was attempted in the Pacific Guano case-adverse possession-was not available until 1870, and, as yet, no
case has directly held an individual to have acquired good title
against the State by this method.55
2.1928 to 1951
In 1928, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Cape
Homain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-CarolinaCanning
56 a case which since has generated what might be called
Co.,
51. State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484 (1884); Frampton v. Wheat, 27 S.C.
288, 3 S.E. 462 (1887); Heyward v. Farmer's Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19
S.E. 963 (1894); Nathans v. Steinmeyer, 57 S.C. 386, 35 S.E. 733 (1900);
West End Dev. Co. v. Thomas, 92 S.C. 229, 75 S.E. 450 (1912); Gadsden v.
West Shore Inv. Co., 99 S.C. 172, 82 S.E. 1052 (1914); Haesloop v. City
Council of Charleston, 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E. 596 (1923); Town of Port
Royal v. Charleston & S.C. Ry. Co., 136 S.C. 525, 134 S.E. 497 (1926);

Cheves v. City Council of Charleston, 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 867 (1927).

52. See, e.g., State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484 (1884); Heyward v. Farmer's
Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1894).
53. Heyward v. Farmer's Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1894);
Nathans v. Steinmeyer, 57 S.C. 386, 35 S.E. 733 (1900).
54. Gadsden v. West Shore Inv. Co., 99 S.C. 172, 82 S.E. 1052 (1914);
Town of Port Royal v. Charleston & S.C. Ry. Co., 136 S.C. 525, 134 S.E. 497

(1926).
55. See the remarks of Logan & Williams, .u/pra note 50, at 675-76.
56. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
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"spirited discussion" about tideland ownership. For example,
it has been stated as a criticism of Cape Romain that "Marshlands are real estate submerged by salt water twice a day, and
the rules relating thereto should not be changed in the twentieth
century in such a manner as to throw doubt upon what was
legally done or decided in the eighteenth century. '57 Contrariwise, Cape Romain has also been said to be "in accord with a
well-settled rule in this State, that title to land below highwater mark of tidal navigable streams is in the State."581
The case itself was an action by the plaintiff Land Co. to
restrain the defendant canning companies from trespassing on
lands claimed by the plaintiff and for damages for past acts of
trespass. The defendants denied the allegations of the complaint
and further claimed that they had been operating on the lands
in question under a lease from the State Board of Fisheries that
entitled them to engage in the several acts necessary for oyster
cultivation between high and low water marks along the several
streams in issue.
The case was heard by the lower court and judgment rendered
for the defendants on the sole ground that the plaintiff had
failed to prove title to the land between high and low water
mark in the navigable streams in questions.
On appeal, by the plaintiff, the Court saw the sole question
to be, "does the plaintiff have title to low water mark in the
navigable streams named ?"59

The several grants covering the plaintiff's claimed lands had
all originated as grants from the State to various persons and
ultimately been acquired by the plaintiff. The passage of title
to the plaintiff through the various grant lines was apparently
proper, and no question was raised in this regard. The fact that
all the grants had originated with the State, was, however, an
important element in the Court's reasoning because, to answer
the primary question posed above, the Court, of necessity, had
to determine the extent and character of the State's ownership
in lands of the type involved in the case at hand. Only by
answering this question could the Court decide whether a strict
or liberal rule of construction should be applied to the grants
held by the plaintiff and thus determine if title to the disputed
lands had passed out of the State and vested in the plaintiff.
57. Horlbeck, Titles to Marshlandsin South Carolina, Part II, 14 S.C.L.Q

335, 363-64 (1962).

58. 1935-36 Op. Arr'y

GEN.

258 (S.C.).

59. 148 S.C. 428, 433, 146 S.E. 434, 435 (1928).
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The Court, then, to resolve this subsidiary, but essential question, held at the very beginning of the opinion that title to
marshland was in the State as a trust for the benefit of the
wuano
public. (Citing several cases, including State v. Pacific
Co.)
Having decided this point, the Court applied an extremely
strict rule of construction to the grants in question (apparently
derived from principles stated in the Pacific Guano case60 ) and
found that none of the grants were sufficiently express to pass
title from the State to the plaintiff below high water mark.
One further remark was made by the Court in Cape Romain
concerning marshlands and it is this remark which has caused
much of the subsequently difficutly:
The title to land below high-water mark on tidal navigable streams, under the well-settled rule, is in the
State, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in trust
for public purposes.61
Some writers have contended that this statement is entirely
dicta and should not be read to prevent private persons from
obtaining title to marshlands.6 2 The State Attorney General, in
numerous opinions, has consistently expressed the view that the
statement is a part of the holding of the case and0 3precludes sale
of marshlands except by an act of the legislature.
In the opinion of the authors of this report, neither view
represents an entirely accurate reading of Cape Romain. The
writers believe that a, careful examination of the case leads to
the conclusion that the actual and necessary holding of Oape
Romain is that tidelands are owned by the State in trust for the
people, and that any grant which purports to convey such land
60. The rule of construction suggested in Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. 50, 86

(1884) was:

In all grants from the government to the subject, the terms of the
grant are to be taken most strongly against the grantee, and in
favor of the grantor, reversing the rule as between individuals, on
the ground that the grant is supposed to be made at the solicitation of the grantee, and the form and terms of the particular instrument of grant proposed by him and submitted to the government for its allowance. But this rule applies a fortiori to a case
where such grant by a government to individual proprietors is
claimed to be not merely a conveyance of title to land, but also a
portion of that public domain which the government held in a
fiduciary relation, for general and public use.
61. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434, 437 (1928).
62. See Horlbeck, supra note 57, at 353; Logan & Williams, supra note 50,
at 667.
63. Perhaps the most complete of these opinions is that dated April 2, 1957
(1956-57 Op. ATr'y GEN. 291).
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will be very strictly construed; but this is not to say that such
lands can never be sold as might be indicated by the language
quoted above, but rather that the ability to sell and the method
of sale remain open questions under Cape Romain.
It is also the opinion of the present writers that the holding
of Cape Romain is fully in accord with the early case of Pacific
Guano and that Cape Romain is quite consistent with that
earlier opinion.
To contend, therefore, that Cape Romain overturned prior
legal principles and introduced uncertainty into the law is a
point not well-taken. Indeed, if anything, the case reaffirmed
long-standing rules of the common law.
This view of the Cape Romain decision obtains support from
remarks by the Court itself in the 1950 case of Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Service Authority"4 :
We adhere to our opinion in [Cape Romain] wherein it
was said, "The title to land below high-water mark on
tidal navigable streams, under the well-settled rule, is
in the state, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held
in trust for public purposes." But we do not deem it
necessary or proper upon this appeal to determine
under what circumstances and by what method, if any,
title might be acquired by private owners ....(I
3. 1950 to 1969

Following the decision in the Rice Hope case, the arena for
interpretation and clarification of estuarine law seems to have
shifted to the Attorney General's Office, and through that
office to several state agencies concerned with protecting this
valuable state property.
Perhaps the primary questions which the Attorney General
has had to face are whether or not the State can sell the tidelands to private persons and whether private persons can obtain
title through adverse possession. In a lengthy opinion dated
April 2, 1957, the Attorney General summarized the situation in
these words:
All of this brings us back to the conclusion that the
marsh lands, under the law as it now stands, are not
subject to sale by the Budget and Control Board and
probably not to general sale by the Legislature. The
64. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
65. Id. at 530.
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Legislature by special acts can confirm titles to individual pieces of marsh claimed by adverse possession
and may be able to sell tract by tract by special acts,
but as to this, we would be very doubtful until the Supreme Court passes on the matter.66
Regardless of the final answer to these questions, the State, at
the present time, owns substantial quantities of marshland and
the practical problem of management is a pressing one. There
are eight separate State Agencies now handling various aspects
of estuarine management and exercising concurrent (and, in
some instances perhaps, conflicting) jurisdiction. 7 In addition,
neighboring states and several agencies of the Federal Government have duties of control affecting marshlands in South
Carolina.6
Because of the value and importance of marshland to the
State, it would seem to be advisable to study the possibility of
establishing a single agency charged with at least the duties
of co-ordinating the activities of the several existing state
agencies, or perhaps re-organizing the present administrative
structure of controls over marshland to obtain more efficient
management.

66. Supra, note 63, at 297.
67. These agencies include: (1) South Carolina Wildlife Resources Dep't,
(a) Div'n of Game, (b) Div'n of Boating, (c) Div'n of Commercial Fisheries;
(2) South Carolina Forestry Comm'n, Div'n of State Parks; (3) South
Carolina Highway Dep't; (4) South Carolina Ports Auth.; (5) South Carolina Public Service Auth.; (6) South Carolina Public Service Comm'n; (7)
South Carolina Soil Conservation and Drainage Districts; and (8) South
Carolina Pollution Control Auth.
68. These agencies include: Federal Power Conm'n; United States Navy;
United States Army, Corps of Eng'rs; and United States Coast Guard.
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